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Aristotle on the De anima and the Study of
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Andrea Falcon
1.
Elsewhere I have argued that it is the interest on life - not an interest
in this or that form of life but an interest in life in all its forms and
manifestations - that motivates Aristotle to engage in a study of the
soul.1 But how does Aristotle conceive of the study of life and, more
specically, how does he think that the study of the soul contributes to
the study of life? I would now like to approach these large questions
by starting from what Aristotle says at the outset of the De sensu.
At the beginning of a new investigation, Aristotle is often explicit
as to how the research he is about to carry out is connected with
his other inquires. For instance, it is not unusual for him to say that
having done x, the next thing to do is y. In this way, he establishes
a link between x and y. The opening lines of the De sensu are a case
in point. These lines introduce the reader to the explanatory project
conducted in the short essays traditionally known as Parva naturalia.
Here is a rst, provisional, translation of this interesting passage:
[436 a 1] Since we earlier completed a study of the soul in itself
and each of its powers taken as a part of the soul, it is next to be
investigated about animals and everything that has life, what are
their specic and what are their common activities. [436 a 5] So let’s
assume what was said about the soul, and let’s speak about the rest,
and rst about what is rst.
[436 a 1] ἐpiεὶ δὲ piερὶ ψυχῆς ϰαϑ’αὑτὴν διώρισται ϰαὶ piερὶ τῶν δυνά-
µεων ἑϰάστης ϰατὰ µόριον αὐτῆς, ἐχόµενόν ἐστι piοιήσασϑαι τὴν
ἐpiίσϰεψιν piερὶ τῶν ζῴων ϰαὶ τῶν ζωὴν ἐχόντων ἁpiάντων, τίνες
εἰσὶν ἴδιαι ϰαὶ τίνες ϰοιναὶ piράξεις αὐτῶν. [436 a 5] τὰ µὲν οὖν
εἰρεµένα piερὶ ψυχῆς ὑpiοϰείσϑω, piερὶ δὲ τῶν λοιpiῶν λέγωµεν, ϰαὶ
piρῶτον piερὶ τῶν piρώτων.
∗ This article is a revised version of a paper presented in the context of the
Lecture Series on Aristotle’s De anima in memory of Kurt J. Pritzl at the Catholic
University of America, Washington DC on November 9, 2012.
1. Cf. Falcon 2009.
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In this stretch of text, Aristotle establishes a link between the study
of the soul and the study of life: having covered the soul, the next
investigation is about animals and everything that has life. I will return
to the signicance of the words “animals and everything that has life”
in due course. For the time being, let’s start from what is obvious
before turning to what is not so obvious and potentially controversial.
First, it is clear that the study of the soul comes before the study of
animals and everything that has life in the order of explanation.2 This
is a direct consequence of the foundational role that, according to our
passage, the De anima plays in the study of animals and everything
that has life. In the second part of our passage, Aristotle tells us,
explicitly and unequivocally, that he will build on the results reached
in his study of the soul. This study provides the explanatory starting
points for the investigation of animals and everything that has life.
Second, it is also clear from our passage that the study of the soul and
the study of animals and everything that has life are to be integrated
into a single explanatory project. And yet, it remains to be seen how
Aristotle conceives of their integration. More directly, the integration
envisioned in the opening lines of the De sensu need not be a case of
assimilation. There is no doubt, on the one hand, that some of the
results achieved in the study of the soul are presupposed in the study
of the ensouled beings.3 On the other hand, it is possible to read the
passage at the beginning of the De sensu not simply as saying that
Aristotle has completed his study of the soul and is ready to turn his
attention to another investigation, but rather as saying that he has
moved away from the study of the soul and is about to engage in
another kind of investigation.4 Note, in particular, that Aristotle is not
content to announce the transition from a study of the soul to a study
of animals and everything that has life. He also indicates a shift in focus.
While the previous investigation was concerned with the powers of the
2. My emphasis on explanation is meant to capture the fact that the ultimate goal
of Aristotle’s science is to oer causal explanations. The latter are best understood
as answers to the question “why?”. In answering this question, we give the relevant
cause(s).
3. Note, however, that this language is not used in the opening lines of the De
sensu. More on the signicance of this absence in due course.
4. I owe this observation to Corcilius 2008, p. 25.
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soul, the upcoming inquiry will deal with the activities of animals and
everything that has life.
2.
At least for the moment, it is not clear how the study oered in the
De anima diers from the study announced at the outset of the De
sensu and why. In order to make some progress on this front, I suggest
taking a closer look at some other details from the opening lines of the
De sensu and, in particular, at how Aristotle refers to the study of the
soul there.
The ἐpiεὶ-clause is open to two readings. Both are discussed by
Alexander in his commentary on the De sensu. We can use his discus-
sion as an introduction to these readings. The rst one takes the study
of the soul (evidently that oered in the De anima) to be divided into
two parts, a study of the soul in itself followed by a study of each of its
powers:
[Aristotle] said “we completed a study of the soul in itself” meaning
“separately concerning the soul as a whole generally and universally,
and separately concerning each of its parts and powers.”5
ϰαϑ’αὑτὴν δὲ εἶpiε piερὶ ψυχῆς διώρισται ἀντὶ τοῦ ἰδίᾳ τε ϰοινῶς ϰαὶ
ϰαϑόλου piερὶ ὅλης ψυχῆς ϰαὶ ἰδίᾳ piερὶ τῶν µόριων τε ϰαὶ δυνάµεων
αὐτῆς ἑϰάστης (In De sensu 3.7-9 Wendland).
To appreciate how Alexander understands the opening lines of the
De sensu on this rst reading, we have to recall that Aristotle begins
his positive account of soul at the outset of the second book of the De
anima with what he calls “the most common account” of the soul (412
a 5-6: ϰοινότατος λόγος). On this reading, the most common (i.e. most
comprehensive) account of the soul is an attempt to say what the soul
is in common (ϰοινῶς) and in general (ϰαϑόλου), that is, with respect
to every type of soul (piερὶ ὅλης ψυχῆς). This language is reminiscent
of what Aristotle says at the outset of the second book of the De anima.
There, Aristotle ends his most common account of the soul by saying
that it has been said what the soul is in general (ϰαϑόλου) (DA 412
b 10). He also introduces his third and nal denition of the soul by
5. I have adapted the translation oered by Alan Towey. Cf. Towey 2000.
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saying that, if something common (ϰοινόν) is to be said about the
soul as a whole, then the latter is rst actuality of a natural, organic
body (412 b 4-5). Aristotle goes on to say that it would be ridiculous
to stop at such a general level of analysis (414 b 27-29). The most
appropriate study of the soul is a serial study of each of the relevant
types of souls (415 a 12-13). Since each of the relevant type of souls can
be understood as a package of powers, the serial study of the relevant
types of souls amounts to a serial study of their relevant powers. To
put it dierently, Aristotle approaches the study of the soul through
a study of the powers of the soul.6 This argumentative strategy does
not entail that the general account of the soul is eventually superseded.
Quite the contrary, the scientic treatment of the soul oered in the De
anima consists of a general account of the soul combined with a serial
account of each of the dierent types of souls (or powers of the soul).
A discussion of the reasons which might have motivated Aristotle to
adopt this strategy is beyond the scope of this paper.7 What matters
for our present discussion is that the ἐpiεὶ-clause, if it is read in this
way, contains a precise description of the contents of the second and
third books of the De anima. On this interpretation, the opening lines
of the De sensu do not simply make contact with the De anima; they
also give us an outline of the argument of the De anima.
It is not clear, however, why Aristotle would have felt the need
to recall such an outline in the opening lines of the De sensu. More
specically, it is not clear how recalling the argument of the De anima
would help Aristotle connect the study of the soul with the study
of animals and everything that has life announced at the outset of
the De sensu. So I suggest turning to the second reading of the ἐpiεὶ-
clause reported by Alexander. According to this second reading, the
qualication “in itself” is introduced not to recall the distinction within
the study of the soul between a common account of the soul and
separate accounts of each of its powers, but rather to contrast the study
of the soul as such and the study that Aristotle is about to launch in the
De sensu. Alexander introduces the second reading with the following
words:
6. For a full account of the argumentative strategy adopted by Aristotle, see
Johansen 2012, pp. 116-117.
7. I have discussed these reasons in Falcon 2009.
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alternatively [Aristotle said] “concerning the soul in itself because it
was not also [determined] concerning the body.”
ἢ ϰαϑ’αὑτὴν piερὶ ψυχῆς ὅτι µὴ ϰαὶ piερὶ τοῦ σώµατος (In De sensu 3.
15-16 Wendland 3. 9-10).
On this second reading, the De anima is an account of the soul and
its powers. It is characterized by a focus on the soul as formal, nal,
and ecient cause of the living body. As a consequence, the De anima
is marked by a (relative) lack of interest in the body in which the soul
is realized. But as Aristotle moves away from the study of the soul as
such, he is able to turn to the study of the body in which the soul is
realized.
The second reading of the ἐpiεὶ-clause is adopted (among others)
by Moerbeke in his Latin translation of the De sensu. He renders
the Greek as follows: “quoniam autem de anima secundum [se] ipsam
determinatum est et de virtute qualibet ex parte ipsius.” His translation
adds one important element to the interpretation developed up to this
point. Moerbeke takes ϰατὰ µόριον together with αὐτῆς and renders
these three words with the Latin ex parte ipsius (sc. animae). It is quite
clear that ex parte animae is to be connected and contrasted with ex
parte corporis.8 On this translation, the opening lines of the De sensu
describe the De anima as a study of the soul and each of its powers
considered with regard to the soul. Following Moerbeke (and Thomas
Aquinas), we may translate the opening stretch of the De sensu as
follows:
[436 a 1] Since we earlier completed the study of the soul in itself
and concerning each of its powers considered with regard to the soul, it
is next to be investigated about animals and everything that has life,
what are their specic and what are their common activities. [436 a
5] So let’s assume what was said about the soul and let’s speak about
the rest, and rst about what is rst.
8. Cf. Thomas de Aquino, Sentencia libri de sensu et sensato, in Gauthier 1985,
7.135-145: “dico ergo primo quod iam determinatum est in libro De anima de anima
secundum se ipsam, ubi scilicet anima diniuit, iterum consequenter determinatum
est de qualibet virtute, id est potencia eius, sed hoc dico “ex parte ipsius”: cum enim
potencie anime preter intellectum sint actus quarundam parcium corporis, dupliciter
de eis considerari potest: uno modo secundum quod pertinent ad anima quasi quedam
potencie vel virtutes ipsius, alio modo ex parte corporis.”
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On this reading, Aristotle tells us what is new in the study he is
about to launch. He also gives us a way not only to contrast but also
to connect the study that he is about to launch, namely the study
of animals and everything that has life, with the study of the soul
conducted in the De anima. While the De anima is concerned with
the study of the soul - to be conducted through a study of its powers
- the opening lines of the De sensu announce a study of animals and
everything that has life - to be conducted through as study of their
activities.
3.
Two features of the Aristotelian project, as it emerges from the second
reading of the opening lines of the De sensu, require further elaboration.
We need to understand, on the one hand, why a study of the activities
of animals and everything that has life leads to a study of the body
involved in those activities and, on the other hand, why the study of
the soul conducted through a study of its powers does not lead to a
study of the body in which those powers are realized.
Consider the case of animal locomotion (poreia). Poreia is not only
an activity that is common to many, if not most, animals; it is also
an activity that is naturally articulated into specic modes: ying,
swimming, walking and other comparable forms of animal progression.
Therefore, a study of poreia must be a study of the dierent ways in
which animals move around.9 This study entails, in turn, a study of the
specic bodies involved in the dierent modes of animal locomotion.
There is no need to review the teleological framework that Aristotle
employs in the explanation of the relevant activities. Here suce it to
say that the body is regarded as an organ or a tool whose presence is
for the exercise of the relevant activity. What matters for the present
discussion is that an explanation of the presence of certain bodily
features as a necessary prerequisite for the performance of certain
activities is part of the explanation of those activities. In the case of
animal locomotion, in particular, the explanation of the various parts
involved in bodily displacement is a part of the explanation of what is
specic about the dierent modes of animal locomotion. This helps us
9. PA I 1, 639 b 1-3.
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understand why at the beginning of the De incessu animalium Aristotle
announces a causal study of the bodily parts that are useful to animals
for locomotion,10 but elsewhere he is able to characterize what is done
in this work as a study of animal locomotion,11 or even as a study of
the dierent modes of animal locomotion.12
This approach to the study of the activities performed by living
beings makes it even more pressing to understand why the study of
the soul conducted through a study of its powers does not extend to
include a study of the body in which those powers are realized. The
opening lines of the De anima may help us make some progress on
this front:
[402 a 4] knowledge of the soul is thought to contribute greatly to
all truth, but especially to [truth about] nature, for the soul is like
a principle of living beings. [402 a 7] We seek to study and have
knowledge of its nature and being, and then of the things that come
along in relation to it: some of them are thought to be aections
proper to the soul, while others [are thought] to belong to living
beings on account of the soul.
[402 a 4] δοϰεῖ δὲ ϰαὶ piρὸς ἀλήϑειαν ἅpiασαν ἡ γνῶσις αὐτῆς µεγάλα
συµβάλλεσϑαι, µάλιστα δὲ piρὸς τὴν φύσιν· ἔστι γὰρ οἷον ἀρχὴ τῶν
ζῴων. [402 a 7] ἐpiιζητοῦµεν δὲ ϑεωρῆσαι ϰαὶ γνῶναι τήν τε φύσιν
αὐτῆς ϰαὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, εἶϑ’ ὅσα συµβέβηϰε piερὶ αὐτήν· ὧν τὰ µὲν
ἴδια piάϑη τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι δοϰεῖ, τὰ δὲ δι’ ἐϰείνην ϰαὶ τοῖς ζῴοις
ὑpiάρχειν.
The rst part of our passage introduces the object of study of the
De anima: the soul as a principle of living beings. At the outset of
our investigation, we do not know what the soul is; we only know
that the presence of a soul is what distinguishes a living from a non-
living being. Hence, Aristotle has good reasons to describe the soul
10. IA 1, 704 a 4-6. The very end of IA reinforces the idea that IA and PA work
together in the explanation of the parts of animals: “so much for the parts of animals,
the others and those concerned with progression and every [form of] locomotion” (IA
19, 714 b 20-23).
11. PA IV 11, 690 b 15 and 692 b 17; IV 13, 696 a 10-13.
12. DC II 2, 284 b 13. Cf. the opening lines of the De motu animalium, where
Aristotle, in making contact with De incessu animalium, characterizes the latter as a
study of the specic kinds of locomotion and the causes of their attributes.
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as a source, or a principle, of living beings.13 We can reasonably
expect that by the end of the De anima we will have learned a great
deal about the soul, including the precise sense in which the soul is
a principle of living beings. But we should not expect to learn about
living beings because Aristotle does not promise that we will gain
knowledge about them. He only promises that we will gain knowledge
about the nature of the soul. We will obtain that result by engaging in
a search for the ti esti of the soul. Note that Aristotle engages in this
project without assuming that there are attributes that belong to the
soul to the exclusion of the body. On the contrary, the promise made
in the second part of our passage is carefully crafted to remain open on
this point: while some things are thought to belong to the soul alone,
others are thought to belong to living beings in virtue of the soul. It is
telling that, when a few lines below Aristotle turns to the attributes of
the soul, his working hypothesis is that the soul is not separable from
the body as its attributes are manifestly common to the body and the
soul. Thinking is introduced as an attribute that may pertain to the
soul to the exclusion of the body. But Aristotle is very careful not to
endorse this view. At this early stage of his investigation, thinking is
presented only as a possible exception to the rule.
The subsequent investigation of the soul remains outside the scope
of our present discussion. What matters is that this investigation
conrms Aristotle’s commitment to treating the soul as something that
is not separable from the body. It is this commitment that should alert
us to the danger of thinking that the De anima is a study of the soul
in isolation from the body. This thought is suggested by the second
reading of the opening lines of the De sensu. We should resist it. And
yet, it is clear that there are serious limitations to what can be said
about the body if one is concerned with the ti esti of the soul. The
“most common account” oered at the outset of the second book of
the De anima illustrates this last point. On the one hand, Aristotle is
supremely condent that this account conrms the hylomorphic unity
of the soul and the body. He tells us that “we should not ask whether
the soul and the body are one any more than whether the wax and
13. For a few lucid remarks on this point, I refer the reader to Corcilius 2008, pp.
22-26. He makes this point by saying that at the beginning of the De anima “soul” is
just a placeholder (“Platzhalter”: 23).
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the shape are one” (412 b 6-8). On the other hand, it is fairly clear
that there is not much one can say about the body at this general level
besides the fact that it has to be organized in a certain way to support
the soul as a source of life. This is one of the messages conveyed by
the denition of the soul as rst actuality of a body which is not only
natural but also organic (412 b 4-6).14
4.
But why should Aristotle nd a search for the ti esti of the soul a
compelling project in the rst place? The opening lines of the De
anima give us a very good reason that we need to get as clear as
possible about the soul: the soul is a source, or a principle, of living
beings; hence, clarity about the soul is required to engage in an optimal
study of living beings.15 Note that I have chosen to render τῶν ζῴων
and τοῖς ζῴοις with “living beings.” I have defended this translation
elsewhere.16 Here suce it to say that a primary task that Aristotle sets
for himself in the De anima is to clarify the concept of life. The thesis
that life is not a single phainomenon is introduced at the beginning of
De anima II 2, where Aristotle states that being alive (ζῆν) is said in
many ways (413 a 22). It is only over the course of the De anima that
Aristotle is able not only to show that animals and plants are dierent
kinds of living beings, but also to explain why this is. Retrospectively,
in light of this achievement, it may be felt that the language Aristotle
adopts in the opening lines of the De anima is ambiguous between the
claim that the soul is a principle of any living beings that there might
be and the claim that the soul is a principle of animals. But it makes
perfect sense for Aristotle, right at the beginning of his investigation,
to speak, vaguely, of living beings. At that point, he does not have at
14. I have explored this idea in Falcon 2009, pp. 167-181, especially pp. 175-179.
15. Still, the opening lines of the De anima do not entail that the interest in the
soul is limited or conned to its relevance to the study of life. Quite the contrary,
the biological orientation of the De anima is fully compatible with the claim that
the De anima has theoretical implications that go emphatically beyond the narrow
boundaries of the study of living beings. As Aristotle himself says at the outset of the
De anima, the study of souls contribute to all truth.
16. I have discussed these reasons in Falcon 2009.
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his disposal the conceptual resources to show that plants and animals
are dierent types of living beings.
As we reect on how best to translate the opening lines of the De
anima, it is natural to return to the opening lines of the De sensu. Since
we are explicitly told that the De sensu builds on the results achieved
in the De anima, it is not open to us to assume that the distinction
between animals and plants is not available to Aristotle at the outset of
the De sensu. But this only makes his choice of words more interesting.
We have seen that Aristotle speaks of animals and everything that has
life rather than animals and plants. Of course, the phrase “everything
that has life” includes plants. But it would be a mistake to infer from
this that the opening lines of the De sensu announce a study of animals
and plants based on the results reached in the investigation of the soul
and its powers. If this were what Aristotle had in mind, he would have
spoken a study of τῶν ζῴων ϰαὶ τῶν φυτῶν. Instead, he speaks of a
study of τῶν ζῴων ϰαὶ τῶν ζωὴν ἐχόντων ἁpiάντων.
To study everything that has life is not simply to study animals
and plants. To see why, we have to recall the theory of science outlined
in the Posterior Analytics. This theory requires Aristotle to give expla-
nations at the right level of generality.17 In some cases, this means
seeking an explanation in common to most, or even all, animals; in
other cases, it entails going beyond the case of animals in order to
look for a causal explanation that applies to everything that has life,
including plants. This is exactly what Aristotle has in mind in the
opening lines of the De sensu. We should not forget that these lines, in
addition to introducing the investigation conducted in the De sensu, are
meant to introduce the reader to the explanatory project conducted in
the short essays traditionally known as Parva naturalia. These essays
can be divided into two distinct groups, reecting two distinct explana-
tory levels. While the rst group of essays deals with activities that
pertain to some, most, or even all animals (De sensu, On Memory and
Recollection, On Sleep, On Dreams, On Divination in Sleep), the second
is concerned with aspects of life that are not restricted to animals (On
Length and Shortness of Life, On Youth and Old Age, Life and Death,
17. The best introduction to this explanatory concern, and how it controls the
study of life, remains Lennox 1987.
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Respiration). It is in this second group of essays that we nd examples
of a common study of animals and plants. Not surprisingly, the Aris-
totelian tradition has considered this second group of essays, to the
extent that they are concerned with activities that are common to all
living beings, including plants, as a sort bridge between the study of
animals and plants.
5.
At this point it is clear that we should not describe the project outlined
in the opening lines of the De sensu as a study of the soul followed by
a study of living beings. Nor should we say that it is a study of the
soul followed by a study of animals and plants. Rather, we must say
that it is study of the soul followed by a study of animals and a study
of what is common to animals and plants. If I am right, this is a direct
consequence of a requirement introduced in the Posterior Analytics.
To fully appreciate the implications of this approach, we need to pay
attention to yet another interesting feature of this explanatory project.
It is fairly clear that even when Aristotle ventures into a common
study of animals and plants, as he does in the group of essays that
deals with the longevity of animals and plants and the causes of their
life and death, the study of animals remains his primary focus. I derive
this conclusion from the following remark placed at the very end of
On the Length and Shortness of Life:
[467 b 5] The cause of long and short life in other animals has been
accounted for. It remains for us to study youth and old age, life and
death. Once these things are determined, our investigation of animals
might come to a conclusion.
[467 b 5] νῦν δὲ piερὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων εἴρηται τὸ αἴτιον piερί τε
µεγέϑος ζωῆς ϰαὶ βραχυβιότητος. λοιpiὸν δ’ ἠµῖν ϑεωρῆσαι piερί τε
νεότητος ϰαὶ γήρως ϰαὶ ζωῆς ϰαὶ ϑανάτου· τούτων γάρ διορισϑέν-
των τέλος ἂν ἡ piερὶ τῶν ζῴων ἔχοι µέϑοδος.
In looking forward to an investigation on the topic of youth and
old age, life and death, Aristotle tells us that as soon as this other
investigation is in place, his study of animals will have reached its goal.
If this cross-reference is taken seriously, then both the investigation
on the longevity of animals and plants and that on life and death and
11
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respiration contribute, directly and immediately, to the study of animals.
This means that Aristotle’s investigation of animals contains as one
of its components an investigation of what is common to animals and
plants. The obvious question is why Aristotle opted for this strategy.
6.
To take stock: the De anima provides the foundation for a theoretically
informed study of life. Aristotle’s rst step in the study of life is the
decision to oer separate studies of animals and plants. It is because
Aristotle takes animals and plants to be dierent kinds of beings that
he is justied in approaching the study of life through separate studies
of animals and plants. But how can he be so condent that animals
and plants are dierent kinds of living being? We have pointed to the
De anima for an answer to this question. The opening lines of the
De sensu conrm the foundational role of the De anima. These lines
suggest, in addition, that his separate studies of animals and plants are
shaped not only by the results reached in the De anima but also by the
methodological recommendation to give explanations at the right level
of generality advanced in the Posterior Analytics.
These results nd conrmation at the beginning of the Meteorology,
where Aristotle outlines a very ambitious research project.18 The last
installment of this project is a study of “animals and plants, both in
common and separately.” At least three things can be noted in con-
nection with how Aristotle describes this study. First, he speaks of a
study of animals and plants (rather than a study of living beings or a
study of life). His choice of words leaves no doubts that he envisions
separate studies of animals and plants.19 Second, he indicates that
animals and plants are to be studied in common and separately. This is
a reference to the fact that his separate studies of animals and plants
18. Meteorology I 1, 338 a 20-339 a 10.
19. Note that there is no reference to a study of the soul in the opening lines of the
Meteorology. It is open to us to read an implicit reference to the De anima in the promise
to oer a study of “animals and plants, both in general and separately.” However,
Aristotle is very clear in the opening lines of the De anima that the contribution of
this work to theoretical knowledge goes beyond natural philosophy. As a result, we
cannot exclude that, in Aristotle’s eyes, the De anima is not meant to appear in the
outline given at the beginning of the Meteorology.
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are controlled by the requirement expressed in the Posterior Analytics.
At the beginning of the Meteorology, we cannot rule out that Aristotle
promises, in addition to separate studies of animals and plants, a study
that captures salient features pertaining in common to both animals
and plants. After reading the De anima and the Parva naturalia, how-
ever, we can safely say that there is not much Aristotle is able to say in
common about animals and plants. What we read at the end of On the
Length and Shortness of Life, moreover, conrms that the study of life
is approached by him through separate studies of animals and plants.
Whatever can be said in common about animals and plants is said in
the course of the study of animals. The special role that the study of
animals plays in Aristotle’s explanatory project nds a conrmation in
the opening lines of the Meteorology. This is the third, and nal, thing
to be noted in connection with the choice of words made in the opening
lines of the Meteorology. The order in which animals and plants are
listed - rst animal and then plants - suggests that the study of life is
approached by Aristotle through a study of animals. The special place
that the study of animals plays in the context of the study of life is
conrmed by the impressive corpus of writings on various aspects of
animal life that has reached us. By contrast, the evidence that Aristotle
wrote on plants is far from being conclusive. We can leave aside the
question whether Aristotle wrote on plants.20 What matters, at least
for the present discussion, is that Aristotle regarded the study of life
as consisting of two parts to be approached in a denite order, rst
animals and then plants.
To conclude, I would like to point to an interesting discrepancy
between the explanatory strategy employed in the study of the soul
as principle of life and the one adopted in the study of the dierent
living beings (animals and plants). Aristotle approaches the study of
20. The evidence that Aristotle wrote on plants is scanty. The Hellenistic catalogue
of Aristotle’s writings transmitted by Diogenes Laertius lists two books on plants.
If Aristotle ever wrote on plants, his work was lost at an early date. Alexander of
Aphrodisias had no access to a book on plants by Aristotle. It has been recently argued,
on the basis of a reference in the De indolentia, that Galen may have had access to
such a book. In explaining how he overcame the distress following the loss of his
library in the re of 192 AD, Galen makes a reference to a number of precious and
rare books he owned and lost in the re, including a work on plants by Aristotle. See
Rashed 2011.
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the soul through a study of its powers. It turns out that the study of
these powers is not only a study of dierent parts of the soul but also
a study of dierent kinds of souls. Note, in particular, that the serial
account of the soul that follows the common account begins with the
nutritive soul. Aristotle begins with the nutritive soul because it is the
power that all living beings have. The study of this kind of soul has a
special status in the argument of the De anima. It is used as a paradigm
for how souls work as the causal principles of living beings. It is in the
course of the study of the nutritive soul that Aristotle establishes that
the soul is a formal, ecient and nal cause. This causal analysis is
subsequently extended to the other basic types of soul.21 Since the soul
is a principle of life, and since dierent kinds of souls are principles of
dierent kinds of living beings, one might be tempted to think that the
study of living beings should adopt the same argumentative strategy.
In other words, just as the study of the soul begins with a study of
the nutritive soul, so the study of life should start with a study of
plants. In fact, this is not how Aristotle proceeds. In his study of life,
Aristotle begins by focusing on animals. It is not dicult to imagine a
reason for this explanatory strategy: the world of plants is considerably
messier, and signicantly more dicult to study, than the world of
animals. It makes sense to plan a systematic study of life starting from
animals rather than from plants. In all probability, Aristotle assigned
a paradigmatic status to the study of animals on the expectation that
some of the methodological results achieved in the study of animals
could be extended to the study of plants.22
Andrea Falcon
Concordia University, Montréal
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